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I.  INTRODUCTION: THE BASICS OF VALUE PLURALISM 
The concluding section of Berlin’s Two Concepts of Liberty helped to 
spark what may now be regarded as a full-fledged value-pluralist 
movement in contemporary moral philosophy.1  Leading contributors to 
this movement include John Gray, Stuart Hampshire, John Kekes, 
Charles Larmore, Steven Lukes, Thomas Nagel, Martha Nussbaum, 
Joseph Raz, Michael Stocker, Charles Taylor, and Bernard Williams.2 
 
 *  Ezra K. Zilkha Chair in Governance Studies and Senior Fellow, The Brookings 
Institution.  This article is an adaptation of material originally printed in WILLIAM A. 
GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM (2002). 
 1. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 
167–72 (1969). 
 2. See JOHN GRAY, ISAIAH BERLIN (1996); STUART HAMPSHIRE, Morality and 
Conflict, in MORALITY AND CONFLICT 140 (1983); JOHN KEKES, THE MORALITY OF 
PLURALISM (1993); CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY (1987); 
STEVEN LUKES, Making Sense of Moral Conflict, in MORAL CONFLICT AND POLITICS 3 
(1991); THOMAS NAGEL, The Fragmentation of Value, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 128 
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During the past decade, moral philosophers have clarified and debated 
many of the complex technical issues raised by value pluralism as well 
as broader objections to the overall approach.3  For the purposes of this 
essay a few basics will suffice. 
(1) Value pluralism is not relativism.  The distinction between 
good and bad, and between good and evil, is objective and 
rationally defensible. 
(2) Value pluralists argue that objective goods cannot be fully 
rank ordered.  This means that there is no common measure 
for all goods, which are qualitatively heterogeneous.  It means 
that there is no single summum bonum that is the chief good 
for all individuals.  It means that there are no comprehensive 
lexical orderings among types of goods.  It also means that 
there is no “first virtue of social institutions,”4 but rather a 
range of public goods and virtues whose relative importance 
will depend on circumstances. 
(3) Some goods are basic in the sense that they form part of any 
choiceworthy conception of a human life.  To be deprived of 
such goods is to be forced to endure the great evils of 
existence.  All decent regimes endeavor to minimize the 
frequency and scope of such deprivations. 
(4) Beyond this parsimonious list of basic goods, there is a wide 
range of legitimate diversity—of individual conceptions of 
good lives, and also of public cultures and public purposes.  
This range of legitimate diversity defines the zone of 
individual liberty, and also of deliberation and democratic 
decisionmaking.  Where necessity, natural or moral, ends, 
choice begins. 
(5) The denial of value pluralism is some form of what I will call 
“monism.”  A theory of value is monistic, I will say, if it 
 
(1979); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN 
GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY (rev. ed. 2001); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF 
FREEDOM (1986); MICHAEL STOCKER, PLURAL AND CONFLICTING VALUES (1990); 
BERNARD WILLIAMS, Conflicts of Values, in MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 
1973–1980, at 71 (1981); Charles Taylor, The Diversity of Goods, in UTILITARIANISM 
AND BEYOND 129 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982). 
 3. See INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON (Ruth 
Chang ed., 1997); see also Glen Newey, Metaphysics Postponed: Liberalism, Pluralism, 
and Neutrality, 45 POL. STUD. 296 (1997); Glen Newey, Value-Pluralism in Contemporary 
Liberalism, 37 DIALOGUE: CAN. PHIL. REV. 493 (1998). 
 4. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (1971) (asserting justice to be “the 
first virtue of social institutions”). 
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either (a) reduces goods to a common measure or (b) creates 
a comprehensive hierarchy or ordering among goods. 
One must ask why value pluralism is to be preferred to the various 
forms of monism that thinkers have advanced since the beginning of 
philosophy as we know it. 
To begin, monistic accounts of value lead to Procrustean distortions of 
moral argument.  The vicissitudes of hedonism and utilitarianism in this 
respect are well known.  Even Kant could not maintain the position that 
the good will is the only good with moral weight, whence his account of 
the “highest good,” understood as a heterogeneous composite of inner 
worthiness and external good fortune. 
Second, our moral experience suggests that the tension among broad 
structures or theories of value—consequentialism, deontology, and 
virtue theory; general and particular obligations; regard for others and 
justified self-regard—is rooted in a genuine heterogeneity of value.  If 
so, no amount of philosophical argument or cultural progress can lead to 
the definitive victory of one account of value over the rest.  Moral 
reflection is the effort to bring different dimensions of value to bear on 
specific occasions of judgment and to determine how they are best 
balanced or ordered, given the facts of the case. 
Many practitioners, and not a few philosophers, shy away from value 
pluralism out of fear that it leads to deliberative anarchy.  Experience 
suggests that this is not necessarily so. There can be right answers, 
widely recognized as such, even in the absence of general rules for 
ordering or aggregating diverse goods. 
It is true, as John Rawls pointed out more than thirty years ago, that 
pluralism on the level of values does not rule out in principle the 
existence of general rules for attaching weights to particular values or 
for establishing at least a partial ordering among them.5  But in practice 
these rules prove vulnerable to counterexamples or extreme situations.  
As Brian Barry observes, Rawls’s own effort to establish lexical 
priorities among heterogeneous goods does not succeed: “[S]uch a 
degree of simplicity is not to be attained.  We shall . . . have to accept 
the unavoidability of balancing, and we shall also have to accept a 
greater variety of principles than Rawls made room for.”6  But, to repeat, 
 
 5. Id. at 42. 
 6. BRIAN BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT: A REISSUE WITH A NEW INTRODUCTION, 
at lxxi (Univ. of Cal. Press reissue 1990) (1965).  Barry goes on to suggest that 
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the moral particularism I am urging is compatible with the existence of 
right answers in specific cases; there may be compelling reasons to 
conclude that certain trade-offs among competing goods are preferable 
to others. 
II.  THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE PLURALISM 
Even though value pluralism is not relativism, it certainly embodies 
what Thomas Nagel has called the “fragmentation of value.”7  But 
political order cannot be maintained without some agreement.  It is not 
unreasonable to fear that once value pluralism is publicly acknowledged 
as legitimate, it may unleash centrifugal forces that make a decently 
ordered public life impossible.  Within the pluralist framework, how is 
the basis for a viable political community to be secured? 
In this part, I explore three kinds of responses to this question: the 
requirements of public order, the structuring processes of constitutionalism, 
and the force of ethical presumptions. 
A.  The Minimum Conditions of Public Order 
Although pluralists cannot regard social peace and stability as 
dominant goods in all circumstances, they recognize that these goods 
typically help to create the framework within which the attainment of 
other goods becomes possible.  They recognize, then, that anarchy is the 
enemy of pluralism and that political community is, within limits, its 
friend.  Pluralists must therefore endorse what I shall call the minimum 
conditions of public order. 
For modern societies, anyway, these conditions form a familiar list.  
Among them are clear and stable property relations, the rule of law, a 
public authority with the capacity to enforce the law, an economy that 
does not divide the population permanently between a thin stratum of the 
rich and the numerous poor, and a sense of membership in the political 
community strong enough, in most circumstances, to override ethnic and 
religious differences. 
It follows that pluralists are also committed to what may be called the 
conditions of the conditions—those economic and social processes that 
experience suggests are needed, at least in modern and modernizing 
 
something like the “original position,” understood as embodying the requirement that valid 
principles must be capable of receiving the free assent of all those affected by them, 
might nonetheless lead to general principles for balancing competing values.  Id. at lxxi–
lxxii. 
 7. NAGEL, supra note 2, at 128. 
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societies, to secure the minimum conditions of public order.  Among 
these are a suitably regulated market economy, a basic level of social 
provision, and a system of education sufficient to promote not only 
economic competence but also law abidingness and civic attachment. 
I do not mean to suggest that this public framework constitutes an 
ensemble of goods and values that always outweighs other goods and 
values.  Under unusual circumstances, the moral costs of public life may 
become too high to be endured, and individuals may feel impelled 
toward conscientious objection or outright resistance.  Nonetheless, 
pluralists will understand that in the vast majority of circumstances, 
reliable public order increases rather than undermines the ability of 
individuals to live in accordance with their own conceptions of what 
gives life meaning and value.  This does not mean that each can live out 
his conception to the hilt.  The ensemble of conditions of public order 
will typically require some modification of each individual’s primary 
desires.  In the absence of public order, however, the threat to those 
desires will almost always be much greater.  It is rational and reasonable, 
therefore, for pluralists to incorporate a shared sense of the minimum 
conditions of public order into the ensemble of goods they value and 
pursue. 
B.  Constitutionalism 
Constitutionalism offers a second kind of response to the challenge 
posed by the centrifugal tendencies of moral pluralism.  Beyond the 
common foundation and requisites of public order, every political 
community assumes a distinctive form and identity through its constitution.  
A constitution, we may say, represents an authoritative partial ordering 
of public values.  It selects a subset of worthy values, brings them to the 
foreground, and subordinates others to them.  These preferred values 
then become the benchmarks for assessing legislation, public policy, and 
even the condition of public culture. 
Various aspects of this definition require further elaboration. 
To begin, within the pluralist understanding, there is no single 
constitutional ordering that is rationally preferable to all others—
certainly not across differences of space, time, and culture, and arguably 
not even within a given situation.  Nonetheless, the worth of a constitution 
can be assessed along three dimensions: realism, coherence, and 
congruence.  A constitution is realistic if the demands it places on 
citizens are not too heavy for them to bear.  A constitution is coherent if 
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the ensemble of values it represents is not too diverse to coexist within 
the same community.  A constitution is congruent if its broad outlines 
correspond to the moral sentiments of the community and to the 
situation that community confronts. 
Nor, for the pluralist, is there a single account of how a given 
constitution comes to be authoritative.  One model is covenantal 
acceptance: the people of Israel at Sinai.  Another is public ratification 
of the work of a constitutional convention, as in the United States.  A 
third is bargaining among representatives of large forces in a divided 
society—the process that led to the post-apartheid South African 
constitution.  A fourth flows from the ability of a great leader to express 
the spirit of needs of a people in a practicable manner—the Napoleonic 
Code or the French Fifth Republic.  It is even possible for a conqueror to 
establish an authoritative constitution for a conquered people, as the 
Allies did for Germany and the United States for Japan after World War 
II. 
Authoritativeness, we may say, has two sorts of necessary conditions: 
the objective and the subjective.  No proposed constitution can become 
authoritative if it falls below the minimum requirements of realism, 
coherence, and congruence.  Nor can it be authoritative if it fails to gain 
broad acceptance within the community—perhaps not immediately, but 
within a reasonable period of time.  Although the post-World War II 
German constitution met this condition, it seems clear in retrospect that 
the post-World War I Weimar Republic never did. 
A constitution represents only a “partial ordering” of value in three 
senses.  In the first place, there is no guarantee that a community’s 
distinctive constitutional values will always be consistent with the 
minimum requirements of public order, or that in cases of conflict public 
order must yield to constitutional values.  Second, it is not the case that 
constitutional values will always dominate an individual’s ensemble of 
personal values.  There are circumstances in which it is not unreasonable 
for individuals to place the values at the core of their identities above the 
requirements of citizenship. 
Third, a constitution is only a partial ordering because the plurality of 
values that it establishes as preferred will unavoidably come into conflict 
with one another.  Such conflicts are a familiar feature of U.S. 
constitutionalism.  Public purposes understood in the consequentialist 
manner (domestic tranquility) may clash with individual rights understood 
deontologically (a fair trial).  And individual rights may themselves 
come into conflict; consider the tension between the right to a fair trial 
and the freedom of the press. 
From a pluralist standpoint, it is inevitable that many of these conflicts 
will have no single rationally compelling solution.  Reasonable men and 
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women may well disagree about the relative weight to be attached to 
competing values, and many will be able to make legitimate appeal to 
different features of the constitutional framework.  There are no strict 
lexical orderings, even in theory, among basic values. 
In Federalist No. 51, James Madison poses a famous rhetorical 
question: “[W]hat is government itself but the greatest of all reflections 
on human nature?”8  And he continues: “If men were angels, no government 
would be necessary.”9  A philosophical pluralist must disagree.  Even if 
every individual were in Madison’s sense angelic—perfectly capable of 
subordinating ambition and self-interest to reason and public spirit—
nonetheless the incapacity of human reason to resolve fully clashes 
among worthy values means that authoritative mechanisms for resolving 
disputes remain indispensable.  The more reasonable individuals are, the 
more clearly they will understand the need for such mechanisms.  And 
this is true even if there is broad public consensus on constitutional 
matters—on the ensemble of values that are to be brought into the 
foreground. 
From a pluralist standpoint, individuals vested with the power to make 
authoritative decisions—whether judicial, legislative, or executive—
must understand that many of the controversies they are called on to 
resolve represent the clash, not of good and bad, but rather of good and 
good.  This means that these individuals must carry out their duties in a 
particular spirit: to the maximum extent feasible, their decisions should 
reflect what is valuable, not only to the winners, but also to the losers.  
Sometimes this will not be possible.  But when not required by the logic 
of the matter to be resolved, winner-take-all decisions needlessly, and 
therefore wrongfully, diverge from the balance of underlying values at 
stake. 
C.  Ethical Presumption 
The third way in which the centrifugal tendencies of moral pluralism 
are moderated is through a structure of relationships among values that I 
shall call ethical presumption.  To understand the nature of presumption, we 
must start further back. 
More than three decades ago, the noted student of jurisprudence 
Chaim Perelman observed that few philosophers have explored 
 
 8. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 262 (James Madison) (Garry Willis ed., 1982). 
 9. Id. 
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analogies between philosophy and law.  Starting with Plato, many have 
suggested parallels between philosophy and mathematics.  More 
recently, others have tried to refashion philosophy along the lines of 
natural science.  But important structural similarities between philosophy 
and law have been neglected, Perelman suggests.10 
In law, reasonable and honest people can reach differing conclusions, 
unlike mathematics, such that additional evidence cannot suffice to 
overcome their differences, unlike the sciences.  The ubiquity of 
reasonable disagreement in the law suggests a conception of rational 
decision that is neither determined by truth nor driven by arbitrary will, 
and it makes necessary structures of decision that can give authoritative 
force to one reasonable view over others.  Indeed, Perelman argues, the 
very coherence of the idea of authority rests on this conception of 
decisions that are consistent with but not required by reason.11  Authority 
is superfluous, or at best derivative, in spheres in which reason compels 
a unique result.12 
Perelman’s account of reasonable disagreement is more than a little 
reminiscent of Aristotle’s discussion of deliberation.  Aristotle begins, 
and proceeds, by enumerating the matters about which we do not 
deliberate: mathematical truths, law-governed regularities of nature, 
matters of chance, or particular facts, among others.  Instead, we 
deliberate about matters of human agency in which actions do not 
generate fully predictable results, matters in which though subject to 
rules that generally hold good, are uncertain in their issue.13  So 
deliberation is the effort to choose the best course, all things considered, 
in circumstances in which reason shapes but does not fully determine 
that course. 
Perelman takes Aristotle’s argument one important step further.  The 
nature of law, and of practical deliberation more generally, points toward 
the necessary ground of human freedom: 
  
 
 10. See CH. PERELMAN, What the Philosopher May Learn from the Study of Law, 
in JUSTICE, LAW, AND ARGUMENT: ESSAYS ON MORAL AND LEGAL REASONING 163 
(1980). 
 11. Id. at 163–66. 
 12. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 43–44 (Roger Crisp ed. & trans., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2000).  For an outstanding discussion of Aristotelian deliberation influenced 
by value pluralism, see D. Wiggins, Deliberation and Practical Reason, in PRACTICAL 
REASONING 144 (Joseph Raz ed., 1978). 
 13. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at 43. 
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    Only the existence of an argumentation that is neither compelling nor 
arbitrary can give meaning to human freedom, a state in which a reasonable 
choice can be exercised.  If freedom was no more than necessary adherence to a 
previously given natural order, it would exclude all possibility of choice; and if 
the exercise of freedom were not based on reasons, every choice would be 
irrational and would be reduced to an arbitrary decision operating in an 
intellectual void.14 
In short, neither Spinoza’s determinism nor Sartre’s decisionism can 
explain human freedom as we experience and practice it.  Freedom 
operates in a zone of partial but not complete regularity, a discursive 
arena in which some reasons are better than others but none is clearly 
dominant over all of the rest in every situation.  If ethics and politics are 
part of this zone, as they evidently are, then their substance will reflect 
this ceaseless interplay of strong but not compelling reasons grappling 
with the variability of practical circumstances. 
Perelman observes that every system of law embodies a presumption 
in favor of past decisions.  The new and the old do not have to be treated 
in the same fashion; law teaches us to abandon existing rules only if 
good reasons justify their replacement.  This presumption is not absolute, 
but the burden of proof falls on those advocating change.15  In a similar 
spirit, the nineteenth-century scholar Richard Whately, one of the 
founders of the modern study of argumentation, contended that although 
the majority of existing institutions and practices are susceptible of 
improvement, “the ‘Burden of Proof’ lies with him who proposes an 
alteration; simply, on the ground that since a change is not a good in 
itself, he who demands a change should show cause for it.”16 
The reasoning underlying this stance is straightforward.  The merits 
and defects of the status quo are well known.  Unless the status quo is so 
intolerable that any change would be for the better, or at least not for the 
worse, then there is a possibility that a proposed change could produce a 
state of affairs that is even less desirable than the admittedly defective 
status quo.  That is why the burden of proof is on the advocate of change 
to show why the proposed reform is unlikely to make matters worse, all 
things considered, and that those at greatest risk of harm are situated 
 
 14. CH. PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON 
ARGUMENTATION 514 (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., Univ. of Notre Dame 
Press 1969) (1958); see also PERELMAN, supra note 10, at 169–70. 
 15. PERELMAN, supra note 10, at 170. 
 16. RICHARD WHATELY, ELEMENTS OF RHETORIC 91 (Scholars’ Facsimiles & 
Reprints 1991) (1846); see also DOUGLAS WALTON, ARGUMENTS FROM IGNORANCE 214–
17 (1996) (discussing this point). 
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well enough to take a hit without suffering a devastating loss that no one 
would reasonably accept. 
The phenomenon of legal presumption has a broader philosophical 
implication, Perelman suggests.  Specifically, the Cartesian prescription 
for universal doubt makes no sense: 
What normal man would put any of his convictions into doubt if the reasons for 
doubt were not more solid than the opinion to which they were opposed?  To 
shake a belief there is need, as with a lever, for a point of leverage more solid 
than what is to be moved. . . .  One could formulate the principle of inertia as a 
directive: One should not change anything without reason.  If one maintains that 
our ideas, our rules, and our behavior are devoid of an absolute foundation, and 
that for this reason, the pros and cons are equally worthy, and that one must 
therefore in philosophy make a tabula rasa of our past, one expresses an exigency 
that comes from utopia and to which one can only conform fictitiously.17 
Whether or not universal doubt is a feasible strategy for theoretical 
philosophy, many follow Perelman in arguing that it is not.  It is notable 
that Descartes does not extend it, or the quest for certainty, to practical 
life.  In Perelman’s formulation, he distinguishes between “our ideas” 
and “our behavior.”18  This suggests an important distinction between 
theoretical and practical reflection.  The decision to accept no merely 
probable metaphysical or scientific proposition as true may leave the 
mind suspended in a state of permanent agnosticism.  The consequences 
for practice are very different: the decision to accept no merely probable 
moral or political proposition as valid calls the status quo into question 
without being able to put anything in its place.  But practical life does 
not wait for ethics and political philosophy to arrive at certainty.  
Decisions must be made, here and now, on the basis of limited—or 
complex and confusing—evidence and argument.  The practical analogue 
of theoretical agnosticism, namely indecision that leads to inaction, is 
itself a decision that affects, and usually but not always sustains, the 
status quo.19  Although the presumption in favor of the status quo may 
appear conservative, the willingness to make practical decisions on 
grounds well short of certainty opens the door to changes that a more 
stringent standard would rule out. 
The reasons advanced to justify decisions typically include general 
maxims tacitly, or less frequently explicitly, derived from moral or 
political theory.  The absence of certainty is not confined to the empirical 
dimensions of decisionmaking but reflects its normative dimensions as 
well.  In this respect, among others, Perelman’s suggestion that philosophy 
could fruitfully take its bearings from law seems plausible, at least for 
 
 17. PERELMAN, supra note 10, at 169–70. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See WALTON, supra note 16, at 214–17. 
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practical philosophy.  This is why moral and political philosophy may 
have something to learn from the role presumptions play in jurisprudence. 
In an important article, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III elaborates the 
conception of presumption in a legal context.  As a backdrop, he 
sketches two opposed pure notions of judging: strict adherence to rules, 
without exception; and equity-based jurisprudence that takes its bearings 
from the facts of each case.20  The problem with strict rules is that they 
will inevitably run up against exceptional cases in which their application 
will appear harsh and unreasonable.  The problem with unfettered equity 
is that it provides little predictability or uniformity, diluting the principal 
advantages of the rule of law.21  For purposes of this discussion, I will 
follow Wilkinson in presupposing that the result or meaning of applying 
rules to particular cases is not in doubt.  The frequent uncertainty of 
interpreting rules raises other questions that I want to set aside for now. 
Against this backdrop, the jurisprudence of presumptions emerges as 
an attempt to combine the advantages of rules—clarity, predictability, 
uniformity—with those of flexibility, prudence, and common sense.  The 
strength of a legal presumption, Wilkinson declares, lies in its rootedness 
in the rule of law; its vulnerability lies in the inability of the drafter of 
any legal rule to anticipate all of the factual circumstances to which it 
may be applicable.22 
In a famous discussion, Aristotle suggests that this combination of 
strength and vulnerability is inherent in the nature of law and lawmaking 
itself: 
The reason is that all law is universal, and there are some things about which 
one cannot speak correctly in universal terms.  In those areas, then, in which it 
is necessary to make universal statements but not possible to do so correctly, the 
law takes account of what happens more often, though it is not unaware that it 
can be in error.  And it is no less correct for doing this; for the error is 
attributable not to the law, nor to the law-giver, but to the nature of the case, 
since the subject-matter of action is like this in its essence. 
    So when law speaks universally, and a particular case arises as an exception 
to the universal rule, then it is right—where the law-giver fails us and has made 
an error by speaking without qualification—to correct the omission.  This will 
be by saying what the lawgiver would himself have said had he been present, 
and would have included within the law had he known.23 
 
 20. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Presumptions, 67 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 907 (1992). 
 21. Id. at 908–10. 
 22. Id. at 908. 
 23. ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at 100. 
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Because the tension between generality and particularity is inherent 
in the nature of law, there are, Wilkinson suggests, no exceptionless 
absolute principles in law.24  Those that may appear absolute are in fact 
strong presumptions that may be overcome in specific circumstances.  
Not that rebutting a strong presumption is easy: one may understand it as 
a well-defended fortress that would require a powerful assault to 
conquer.  Some presumptions are stronger than others.  In American 
constitutional law, the presumption in favor of free political speech can 
be overcome only by the most compelling public interest; in criminal 
cases, the presumption of innocence can be overcome only by evidence 
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a difficult standard to meet.  The 
burden of proof in civil cases is less stringent—the preponderance of the 
evidence is required to sustain the plaintiff’s claim. 
In part, the variation among standards governing the burden of proof 
in different categories of cases reflects differences among the goods and 
values at stake.  In criminal cases, for example, individuals’ lives and 
liberty are at stake.  The prosecution’s burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is designed to minimize the chances that individuals 
will be wrongfully deprived of these very great goods, which enjoy the 
status of natural as well as civil rights in American civic philosophy.  
The system cannot wholly eliminate the possibility of such wrongful 
deprivation, however.  The only way to do so is never to convict anyone 
of a felony, which would deprive the entire society of the advantages of 
the rule of law.  In a universe of plural and competing goods, highly 
demanding protections for accused persons may impose excessive costs 
along other key dimensions of public value. 
We can go further, Wilkinson suggests, towards a precise account of 
how the jurisprudence of presumptions operates in practice.  First, the 
adjudicator must identify the relevant rule of law.  Second, the 
“presumptive strength” of that rule must be identified.  As we have seen, 
some rules enjoy a preferred position in our constitutional system, while 
others are secondary or tertiary.  Third, the adjudicator must assess the 
“degree of stress” that an unforeseen circumstance imposes on that rule.  
In the case of political speech, for example, not only must the 
countervailing state interest be powerful as a matter of principle, but the 
facts of the particular case must clearly bring that interest into play.  
Fourth, the adjudicator must specify, so far as possible, the costs of 
departing from the rule laid down, including not only the costs in the 
particular case but the longer term damage to the credibility of the rule 
 
 24. Wilkinson, supra note 20, at 907. 
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itself.  Finally, the decisionmaker must explain why the result achieved 
by making an exception to the rule is preferable to following the rule.25 
I want to underscore two features of this schema.  First, it does not 
identify some neutral point of equipoise between the jurisprudence of 
rules and the jurisprudence of equity.  Legal rules enjoy a status very 
different from that of, say, propositions advanced in a dialogue.  If laid 
down by those duly empowered to create them, the rules have presumptive 
authority flowing from their source.  There is a presumption, stronger in 
some cases than others, but always powerful, in favor of applying the 
rules laid down.  The burden of proof lies on those who would relax the 
rules or carve out exceptions to them.  In these circumstances, it would 
not suffice to show that making an accommodation would yield an 
outcome just as good, all things considered, as following the rule.  A 
preponderance of considerations must point toward the exception being 
sought.  Just how strong a preponderance will depend on the nature of 
the rule in question. 
Second, the process of justifying the exception often takes place in a 
context of multiple values.  The rule in question, let us say, seeks to 
promote a particular public value.  The case for granting an exception 
will typically appeal to a different value: if allowed to operate without 
modification in pursuit of its intended value, it may be alleged, the rule 
will exact too high a price as measured along another important 
dimension of value that the system of law cannot reasonably ignore. 
I began this discussion of legal presumptions with Perelman’s suggestion 
that philosophy should take its bearings from law and jurisprudence.  I 
now want to apply this suggestion to the special case of practical, that is, 
moral and political, philosophy.  My hypothesis is this: like legal rules, 
moral and political principles act as rebuttable presumptions.  The more 
entrenched the principle, the more central it is to our understanding, the 
weightier the considerations that will be needed to override it.  But no 
principle is absolute, that is, exceptionless.26 
Two examples from applied ethics will clarify this conjecture. 
Sissela Bok’s analysis of lying takes its bearings from a “presumption 
against lying”—the premise that 
 
 25. Id. at 914. 
 26. For a clear discussion of the comparative strength of arguments, see JOSEPH 
RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 25–28 (1975).  See also PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-
TYTECA, supra note 14, 465–71. 
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[T]ruthful statements are preferable to lies in the absence of special considerations.  
This premise gives an initial negative weight to lies.  It holds that they are not 
neutral from the point of view of our choices; that lying requires explanation, 
whereas truth ordinarily does not.27 
Bok explores, but ultimately rejects, the thesis that one should never lie; 
in certain extreme but hardly unknown situations, the consequences of 
truth telling are simply unacceptable.  The inquiry then turns to the 
nature of valid excuses—considerations of value sufficient to rebut the 
presumption against lying.  Grotius offers one important argument—that 
in some circumstances an agent bent on doing evil forfeits his right to 
truth.  For example, you are not morally obligated to tell the truth when 
the secret police of a tyrannical regime ask whether you are harboring 
refugees from persecution.28  Another important suggestion is that in 
circumstances in which it is justified to use force in self-defense or to 
protect innocent third parties, it would also be acceptable to use forms of 
deceit, including lies.29  There are several other categories of excuses 
that are potentially valid in specific circumstances.  Nonetheless, the 
presumption in favor of truth telling remains powerful, and the grounds 
for rebutting that presumption remain stringent. 
Michael Walzer’s exploration of just and unjust wars deploys the 
classic distinction between the justice of war—the valid or invalid 
reasons for which wars are fought, and the justice in war—the 
permissible or forbidden means by which wars are conducted.  Justice in 
war is delimited by what Walzer calls the war convention.  At the heart 
of that convention is a sharp distinction between combatants and 
noncombatants.  The latter are “men and women with rights [who] 
cannot be used for some military purpose, even if it is a legitimate 
purpose.”30  Even just wars must be fought justly; the ends of wars do 
not suffice to justify the means of war. 
Or do they?  In the end, Walzer cannot quite defend the thesis that the 
rights of noncombatants are inviolate, regardless of the circumstances.  
Although he resists utilitarianism, theories of proportionality, and even 
sliding scale justifications of means relative to the justice of ends as 
insufficiently stringent, the weight of human experience moves him to 
offer instead a thesis that falls just short of absolutism: instead of fiat 
justicia ruat coelum, act justly unless the heavens are really about to 
fall.31  The war convention is overridden in cases of “imminent catastrophe” 
 
 27. SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 30 (1978). 
 28. Id. at 40–41. 
 29. Id. at 41. 
 30. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 137 (4th ed. 2000). 
 31. Id. at 230–31. 
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or supreme emergency—credible threats to the very existence of a nation 
or a people, or the likely victory of a murderous tyranny.32 
From this perspective, had the terror bombing of German cities during 
World War II been absolutely necessary to defeat Hitler, it would have 
been justified.  Similarly, if the Israelis were faced with imminent defeat 
and probable genocide at the hands of Arab military forces, they would 
be justified in using atomic weapons against Damascus and Baghdad if 
there were no other way of averting catastrophe.  Rights have great 
moral weight, but they do not function as trumps in every shuffle of the 
deck.  Rights have enormous value, but they are not the only things of 
value in our moral universe. 
The maxim that practical principles function as powerful but 
rebuttable presumptions applies to two arenas that are important for our 
purposes.  The first may be called ordinary universal morality—the 
principles of conduct that are embedded in different forms in the world’s 
great religions and in the normal social practices of humankind.  
Strictures against lying, theft, murder, sexual anarchy, and the oppression of 
the weak, among many others, constitute this realm. 
The maxim of practical principles as presumptions also applies, less 
obviously, to the arena of public culture, by which I mean the ensemble 
of practical principles that gives to each political community its distinct 
identity.  In the case of the United States, for example, a kind of social 
egalitarianism, libertarianism, commitment to equal opportunity and 
personal responsibility, and mistrust of authority, including governmental 
authority, help to define a public culture that differs from that of other 
democratic nations.  The wind is in the sails of those who deploy these 
principles in defense of specific public policy proposals.  By contrast, 
those who employ opposed principles, say sociological determinism 
rather than personal responsibility, bear a heavy burden of proof. 
I do not want to be misunderstood as suggesting that principles of 
public culture are immune to skeptical questioning.  On the contrary, 
skeptics have a number of dialectical tools ready at hand.  The skeptic 
may suggest, first, that there are cases in which it makes no sense to 
apply the dominant principles.  For example, do we really want to 
attribute personal responsibility to someone laboring under a severe 
cognitive distortion?  Second, the skeptic may suggest that the public 
culture is incoherent, that some of its principles contradict others when 
 
 32. Id. at 232. 
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applied to particular cases, and that in regarding such cases we have no 
choice but to think for ourselves.  Third, the skeptic may suggest that the 
strict application of a particular principle will lead to results that a 
morally decent person of common sense would find hard to accept.  This 
possibility reflects the fact that a particular public culture always 
functions in relation to, and sometimes stands in tension with, the 
background code of universal ordinary morality. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Let me now return to my point of departure.  It is not unreasonable to 
fear that pluralism’s dispersion of value makes the maintenance of 
political community difficult at best.  In response, I have explored three 
sources of commonality that are consistent with pluralism: the minimum 
demands of public order, constitutionalism understood as the selection of 
preferred goods and values, and the ethical presumptions of both 
universal ordinary morality and of specific public cultures.  Taken 
together, these sources ask each individual to consider what it means to 
be a member of the human species, to be an individual whose conception 
of a good and valuable life can only be realized within the framework of 
public order, and to be a social being embedded in, though not determined 
by, a specific constitution and public culture.  The political meaning of 
moral pluralism emerges in the unending dialogue between the 
differentiating force of individuality and the organizing tendencies of 
commonality. 
 
